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Abstract
Online platforms are using warning messages to counter disin-
formation, but current approaches are not evidence-based and
appear ineffective. We designed and empirically evaluated
new disinformation warnings by drawing from the research
that led to effective security warnings. In a laboratory study,
we found that contextual warnings are easily ignored, but in-
terstitial warnings are highly effective at inducing subjects
to visit alternative websites. We then investigated how com-
prehension and risk perception moderate warning effects by
comparing eight interstitial warning designs. This second
study validated that interstitial warnings have a strong effect
and found that while warning design impacts comprehension
and risk perception, neither attribute resulted in a significant
behavioral difference. Our work provides the first empirical
evidence that disinformation warnings can have a strong ef-
fect on users’ information-seeking behaviors, shows a path
forward for effective warnings, and contributes scalable, re-
peatable methods for establishing evidence on the effects of
disinformation warnings.
1 Introduction
Online platforms are being exploited by disinformation
campaigns, which intentionally spread misleading informa-
tion for financial, political, and social purposes [1, 2]. One
countermeasure that platforms have adopted is attaching warn-
ing messages to identified disinformation to help inform users’
decisions and beliefs. Facebook began this practice as early as
December 2016 [3], and Google [4], Bing [5], and Twitter [6]
followed with similar warnings. There has been substantial
public debate about disinformation warnings—especially af-
ter Twitter attached a warning to a May 2020 tweet by U.S.
President Donald Trump [7]—but there is little evidence avail-
able about how these warnings actually affect users. Without
this evidence, it is difficult to say whether disinformation
warnings are a promising endeavor or a futile one.
One reason to believe that disinformation warnings can
be made effective is the evolution of security warnings. At
first, warnings for threats such as malware and phishing web-
sites broadly failed to protect users [8, 9], but after a decade
of iterative, multi-method research, these warnings became
highly effective [10–21]. Modern security warnings reliably
inform users’ security decisions and help users distinguish
harmful and inauthentic content online [10, 17]. Designing
warnings that help users distinguish, contextualize, or avoid
disinformation poses analogous challenges to those solved
by security warnings researchers. In this work, we consider
how to adapt findings and methods from security warnings
research to the domain of disinformation.
One key finding from security research that we adapt to
disinformation is that contextual warnings, which do not in-
terrupt the user or compel them to act, are far less effective at
changing users’ behaviors than interstitial warnings, which
interrupt the user and require interaction [8, 9, 17]. Contex-
tual disinformation warnings have been widely studied and
deployed, but no prior work has evaluated interstitial disinfor-
mation warnings.
Another relevant contribution from security researchers is
a set of rigorous qualitative and quantitative methods for eval-
uating warnings, including structured models, realistic guided
tasks, user interviews, and field studies (e.g., [11, 13, 15–18]).
Our work adapted these methods to empirically examine con-
textual and interstitial disinformation warnings.
Across two studies, we used qualitative approaches (think-
aloud exercises, interviews, and inductive coding) to under-
stand user perceptions of disinformation warnings, as well as
quantitative measures of the warnings’ effects on user behav-
ior. We considered the following research questions:
1. After encountering contextual and interstitial disinforma-
tion warnings, how often do users change their behavior
by opting for alternative sources of information?
2. Why do some users choose not to change their behaviors
after encountering contextual and interstitial disinforma-
tion warnings?
3. Can interstitial warnings that are highly informative ef-
fectively change users’ behaviors?
4. Can interstitial warnings that are highly threatening ef-
fectively change users’ behaviors?
We first conducted a laboratory experiment (n = 40) in
which participants searched for specific facts on Google and
encountered an interstitial or contextual disinformation warn-
ing. The interstitial warning was substantially more effective
at changing user behavior than the contextual warning, in large
part because users did not notice or comprehend the more sub-
tle contextual warning. In post-task interviews, we found two
reasons for the interstitial warning’s strong behavioral effect:
the informativeness of the warning’s messaging, and the warn-
ing’s threatening design, which participants found to convey a
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risk of harm. In a second study conducted on a population of
crowdworkers (n = 236), we confirmed the strong behavioral
effect of interstitial disinformation warnings. We also found
that the effect was not moderated by the informativeness or
the risk of harm conveyed by the warning and hypothesize
that concerningly, the friction introduced by the warning may
be largely responsible for the change in user behavior.
Our results constitute the first evidence that interstitial dis-
information warnings can effectively cause users to opt for
alternative sources of information, and that such warnings
can reliably inform users about the risks posed by disinforma-
tion. We also demonstrate scalable, repeatable methods for
measuring warning effectiveness and testing theories about
warnings’ pathways of effect. Motivated by the successful
trajectory of security warnings research, we contend that con-
tinued research iterating on the warnings and methods we
contribute will make platforms’ ongoing efforts to design and
deploy disinformation warnings more productive.
2 Background and Related Work
Research on disinformation is dispersed across numerous
scientific fields. In computer science, there is mature work on
automatic detection [22–38] and real-world measurement [39–
58], but work on responses and countermeasures is compara-
tively thin (see Section 2.3).
In this section, we discuss the role of websites in disinfor-
mation campaigns, existing research on the effects of disinfor-
mation, and prior work on disinformation countermeasures
(including warnings).
2.1 Disinformation Websites
Disinformation campaigns are typically multimodal, ex-
ploiting many different social and media channels at once [59].
These campaigns use websites as an important tool: to host
content for distribution across platforms, facilitate user track-
ing, and generate ad revenue [42, 45, 60–63]. Disinformation
websites are frequently designed to conceal their provenance
and deceive users into believing that they are legitimate news
or opinion outlets.1 Our work examined whether warnings
can counter this deception and help users distinguish, contex-
tualize, or avoid disinformation websites.
2.2 Effects of Disinformation
Disinformation campaigns hijack the heuristics that users
rely on to make accurate judgments about the truthfulness
of information [66]. For example, disinformation campaigns
often mimic credibility indicators from real news sources [67]
and use bots to promote disinformation and create the appear-
ance of popularity or consensus [46].
Misperceptions that individuals hold after consuming dis-
information are difficult to dispel [66]. Collectively, a mis-
1 Because this deception involves mimicking the conventions and visual
designs of news websites, these outlets are sometimes called fake news
(e.g., [64]) or junk news (e.g., [60, 65]).
informed populace may make social and political decisions
that are not in the society’s best interests [68] (e.g., failing
to mitigate climate change [69]). Influencing policy in this
way—by shaping public perception and creating division—is
a goal of many disinformation campaigns, especially those
by state-level actors [70].
There are several mechanisms by which encountering a
warning before exposure to disinformation can protect users
from harmful effects. Warnings can induce skepticism in
users so they are less likely to take disinformation at face
value [71]. A warning can also make a user more susceptible
to later corrections [66, 72]. Finally, a warning may cause a
user to choose not to read the disinformation at all.
2.3 Responding to Disinformation
There are three main types of responses that platforms and
researchers have considered [73]. The first is deranking dis-
information by changing recommendation algorithms [74].
Academics have studied this approach in simulated models of
social networks [75–80], although not in realistic settings
or with real users. Second, platforms have repeatedly re-
moved disinformation content and banned accounts found
to be promoting disinformation [81–83]. Neither platforms
nor researchers have established evidence on the effects of
these takedowns. Finally, platforms have added warnings,
labels, and other forms of context to posts [4–6, 84, 85].
In contrast with deranking or removing content, which re-
strict users, warnings can inform users’ behaviors [86]. Thus
deranking and removal raise greater concerns about censor-
ship and speech restrictions [87, 88], while warnings offer a
lighter-touch approach—as long as the warnings function in
a way that informs rather than coerces or misguides users.
“Disputed” Warnings The most well-studied disinforma-
tion warnings are contextual labels indicating a story has been
“disputed” or “rated false” by fact checkers [89–94]. These
labels constituted Facebook’s first major effort to counter dis-
information [84], and Google [4], Bing [5], and Twitter [6]
have taken similar approaches. Facebook eventually discon-
tinued use of disputed warnings after determining based on
internal studies that the warnings were of limited utility [84].
More recently Facebook, Instagram, and Twitter all deployed
new warning formats, including interstitials [95, 96].
Some studies of disputed warnings reported no significant
effects on participants’ perceptions of disinformation [90, 91],
while others found effects under certain conditions [89, 93,
94]. Pennycook et al. found that warnings caused participants
to rate disinformation as less accurate after repeated exposure
to the warnings, but not with only a single exposure [89].
Another study by Pennycook identified a counterproductive
implied truth effect: the presence of the warning on some
headlines caused other headlines to be perceived as more
accurate [93]. Seo et al. found that the warnings had a negative
effect on accuracy judgments, but the effect did not persist
when participants encountered the stories again later [94].
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Related Links Bode and Vraga examined the effects of
providing related links to alternative, credible sources of in-
formation alongside disinformation, finding that when the re-
lated links debunked misinformation, participants’ perceived
accuracy of the misinformation decreased [97]. Facebook,
Google Search, and Bing all currently use this approach.
Highlighting Falsehoods Garrett et al. tested a two-part
warning, where participants were first informed that a fact-
checker had identified factual errors in a story, then those
errors were highlighted in the body of the story [98]. Among
users already predisposed to reject the misinformation, this
treatment significantly increased accuracy of beliefs, but it had
no effect among users inclined to believe the misinformation.
Methods of Prior Work In all of these studies, labora-
tory participants looked at screenshots of Facebook-style
posts, then answered survey questions about how truthful
they thought the posts were and whether they would consider
sharing the posts on social media. This method can establish
evidence about the behavior of laboratory participants, which
can form the basis for theories about how users will behave
in real settings. As we discuss below, however, security re-
searchers found that in order to measure realistic responses
to warnings, it is important to design experimental tasks that
cause users to perceive realistic risk [11, 99, 100]. In labora-
tory studies of security warnings, participants complete role-
playing exercises involving sequences of realistic tasks using
the real systems under measurement [9, 11, 99]; the scenarios
used in disinformation warnings studies are comparatively
artificial. The role-playing tasks also permit researchers to em-
pirically observe how participants behave, rather than asking
participants to self-assess their likely behavior.
2.4 Security Warnings
Effective warnings are essential to security because human
error is a major cause of breaches [101]. Early studies of
security warnings found that the warning formats in practice
generally failed to protect users from online risks [8, 99]. In
contrast, modern warnings are extremely effective: a recent
study of over 25 million impressions of browser warnings
showed that they protected users from malware and phishing
websites around 75-90% of the time [10]. This advancement is
due to numerous, rigorous studies over the course of a decade
that tested varied warning designs using diverse experimental
methods and analytic lenses.
The primary methods of early security warnings studies
were laboratory experiments involving supervised tasks, user
interviews, and surveys [8, 9, 11, 18, 20, 99, 100]. These stud-
ies examined users’ beliefs and decision-making processes, in
part by using structured models from warnings science litera-
ture to identify reasons that warnings failed to change users’
behaviors. Security researchers typically used the Communi-
cation–Human Information Processing (C-HIP) model, which
describes five information processing stages that users un-
dergo when receiving a warning. Users must notice the warn-
ing, comprehend the warning’s meaning, believe the warning,
be motivated to heed the warning, and finally, behave in the
manner intended by the warning issuer [102]. By determining
the stage of the C-HIP model at which information process-
ing was failing, researchers learned how to modify warning
designs to increase the strength of the desired effect [9, 11].
Limitations It can be difficult to cause users to perceive
realistic risk in a laboratory, requiring the use of deception
and clever experimental design [99, 100]. It is also important
that laboratory studies address the challenge that participants
may be more likely to disregard warnings that hinder task
completion because they want to complete the task and please
the researchers [11, 100]. More recently, researchers have
overcome these limitations by employing field studies, which
measure users’ reactions to warnings at scale in realistic envi-
ronments [10, 13–15, 17, 19].
This body of work has definitively established that inter-
rupting a user’s workflow with a warning is more effective at
preventing risky behaviors than passively showing the warn-
ing. Wu et al. compared popup warnings to toolbar icons and
found that the popups caused users to behave with signifi-
cantly more caution [8]; Egelman et al. observed that 79% of
participants chose not to click through interstitial warnings
compared to 13% for contextual warnings [9]. As a result,
interstitials and other forms of active security warnings have
become standard in all major browsers [17].
Several studies compared multiple warning designs and
found that clear messages and use of visual cues can improve
comprehension and adherence [11–14]. Personalizing mes-
sages based on users’ psychological factors has not shown a
significant effect on adherence, however [16].
3 Laboratory Study
We began with a laboratory study designed to examine how
participants would process and react to contextual and intersti-
tial disinformation warnings when searching for information.
The search engine context is conducive to studying behavioral
effects because participants have a concrete goal (finding a
piece of information) and multiple pathways to achieve that
goal (different search results and information sources).
We posed three research questions:
RQ1: In encounters with contextual and interstitial
disinformation warnings, do users notice the warnings?
Prior studies of contextual warnings note that one reason
effect sizes are low or insignificant may be that participants
fail to notice the warnings. Because users will never comply
with warnings that they do not notice, effective warnings
must attract users’ attention through conspicuous design or
prominent placement.
RQ2: When users notice contextual and interstitial
warnings, do they understand that the warnings have to
do with disinformation? If a user misunderstands a warn-
ing, they may drop it from further cognitive consideration or
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Figure 1: The contextual warning was displayed on search
results pages.
respond in unintended ways that could increase risk.
RQ3: When users encounter and comprehend con-
textual and interstitial disinformation warnings, do they
change their behaviors in the intended way by opting for
alternative sources of information? This is an important
outcome of warning exposure, which we aim to measure as
described in Section 3.4.
3.1 Warning Designs
We adapted contextual and interstitial disinformation
warnings from modern security warnings used by Google.
Google’s warnings are well-studied [10, 14, 15, 17, 19, 21,
103] and widely deployed, making them a useful template to
design warnings that participants will believe are real.
We developed our contextual warning (Figure 1) based on
a warning for compromised websites that Google displays in
search results. We changed the color of the text from hyperlink
blue to bold black to indicate that the text could not be clicked
and also added a red and white exclamation icon next to the
search result to make the warning more noticeable.
We adapted our interstitial warning (Figure 2) from Google
Chrome’s warning page for malware. We modified the text
to reference disinformation and changed the “Details” button
to “Learn more.” Clicking “Learn more” revealed a message
explaining that an automated system had flagged the site as
disinformation and a “Continue” button that allowed the user
to bypass the warning and continue to their selected page.
3.2 Study Design
In a laboratory setting, each participant completed a think-
aloud role-playing task followed by an interview. By observ-
ing the participant during the role-playing task, we could tell
if they noticed the warnings (RQ1) and altered their behav-
ior in response (RQ3). Using the follow-up interviews, we
could confirm whether the participant noticed the warnings,
ask whether they comprehended the warnings (RQ2), and
seek additional insights into how the participant processed
the warnings.
Role-Playing Task The participant assumed the persona of
an academic researcher trying to find answers to four ques-
tions using Google search. As our subjects were all students,
we believed this persona would be comfortable and aid with
task immersion. For each question, we provided multiple
sources of information and attached warnings to just one of
the sources so that the participant did not have to click through
Figure 2: The interstitial warning was displayed after the
participant clicked a search result.
the warning to complete the task.2 Unknown to the partici-
pant, two questions were control rounds with no warnings and
two were treatment rounds where warnings were activated.
We assigned participants in equal numbers to receive either
contextual or interstitial warnings in both treatment rounds.
Search Tasks We designed the search tasks (shown in Ta-
ble 1) to cover simple facts that could be easily found with
a single Google search. For the treatment tasks, we selected
facts specific to non-American countries and covered by little-
known, non-American news sources in order to satisfy three
additional design goals. First, the facts were related to cur-
rent events due to the study’s focus on news disinformation.
Second, so that participants could choose between multi-
ple sources, each fact was publicly reported by at least two
English-language news websites. Third, we aimed to select
facts and websites that participants were not likely to be fa-
miliar with so as to avoid participants having preconceived
biases about the information or the credibility of the sources.
3.3 Study Procedures
We explained the task and role to each participant at the
beginning of their session. We asked the participant to be-
have as if they were using their own computer and to narrate
their thoughts and actions as they performed the task. We
framed the study as examining research and search engine
usage behaviors to avoid priming participants to think about
disinformation or warnings.
Participants began the task on the Google homepage. We
informed participants that they could use either of two specific
websites to find a particular piece of information, and that
they should start with the first website and could switch to
the second for any reason.3 Control rounds occurred first and
third and treatment rounds occurred second and fourth, with
the question order randomized within those sets.
2Studies of security warnings have shown that this “task focus effect” can
bias participants’ behavior [11, 100].
3This design directly parallels an evaluation of security warnings con-
ducted by Sunshine et al. [11].
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We did not prescribe specific search queries to use, but most
participants used a similar format: a set of terms relevant to
the fact they needed to find combined with the name of the
website on which they wanted to find the information. The
participant would enter the query, navigate through results
to find the requested information, and verbally provide an
answer to the researcher. We would then instruct them to
return to the Google homepage to begin the next round.
3.4 Data Collection
We took notes during each session to record how the par-
ticipant selected search results, browsed the websites to seek
information, reacted to warnings, and described their thoughts
and actions. We also computed two metrics for each warning:
clickthrough rate (CTR) and alternative visit rate (AVR).
Clickthrough Rate CTR is a commonly used metric in
studies of security warnings. It measures the proportion of
warning encounters where a participant dismisses the warning
instead of going back. For contextual warnings, we recorded
a clickthrough if the participant clicked a result that had an
attached warning and a non-clickthrough if they chose a dif-
ferent result or changed the search query to use the second
suggested website. For interstitial warnings, we recorded a
clickthrough if the participant clicked “Learn more” and then
bypassed the warning. If they clicked “Back to safety” or used
the browser back button to go back to the search results, we
recorded a non-clickthrough.
Alternative Visit Rate We also recorded whether partici-
pants who clicked through a warning returned to the results
page and visited an additional source. We used this data to
compute each warning’s AVR: the proportion of tasks where
after attempting to visit an initial source, a participant visits an
alternative source before completing the task. AVR is a new
metric we devised for empirically measuring the behavioral
effects of a disinformation warning. A high AVR indicates
that a warning can influence users to decide to visit secondary
sources of information.4 In some cases this will cause a user
not to see the disinformation at all, and in all cases it exposes
the user to alternative information.
Interview After the final round, we informed participants
of the true purpose of the study, then conducted the interview.
We first asked about the participant’s general understanding of
disinformation: how they defined disinformation, what made
them believe a website might contain disinformation, and if
they had ever encountered disinformation that they knew of.
Next we asked the participant to describe their reactions to
the warnings they encountered during the study. We prompted
participants to elaborate on these responses until we could
4AVR does not capture users’ perceptions of warnings or the accuracy of
their beliefs, which is why we pair this approach with qualitative methods. It
is an important open question whether encounters with high-AVR warnings
are associated with more accurate beliefs, easier correction of misperceptions,
or better ability to distinguish disinformation from real news.
determine whether the participant had noticed and compre-
hended the warnings (RQ1 and RQ2).
Before the next round of questions, we showed the par-
ticipant printouts of the contextual and interstitial warnings
used in the study. We asked whether the participant believed
the warnings would be effective in use, if they felt that one
format would be more effective than the other, and if they had
recommendations for how disinformation warnings in general
could be made more effective.
Finally, we asked about the participant’s demographics,
academic background, and level of news consumption. The
full set of interview questions is included in Appendix A.
Coding We combined interview transcripts with our notes
and observations to form a single report for each session. We
then performed open coding on the reports using Dedoose. In
the initial phase of coding, we produced 253 unique codes ap-
plied to 1343 text excerpts. We condensed similar codes into
themes, then grouped themes into categories if they related
to the same topic but provided different perspectives. Finally,
we analyzed trends in themes across the full population and
within separate treatment groups. Quantifying these trends
supported our theory development.
3.5 Participant Recruiting
We recruited participants through the Princeton University
Survey Research Center as well as distribution lists of vari-
ous university organizations. We received 76 responses and
selected 40 participants. Our participant group consisted of
16 women and 24 men aged 18-28 years old, studying across
17 disciplines.
Clearly this sample is biased in several respects, including
age, education level, and social group. We test later in this
work whether there is a difference between the results from
this sample and a significantly more diverse sample recruited
online (see RQ1 in Section 3). In the context of security
warnings studies, student populations have been shown to
provide similar results to more representative samples [100].
The recruiting and consent materials provided to partic-
ipants indicated that the study would take 30-45 minutes
and focus on the user experience of search engines, with no
mention of disinformation or browser warnings. Participants
signed consent forms before beginning the study and were
paid $15. The study was approved by the Princeton IRB.
3.6 Results
We present quantitative results for the warnings’ behavioral
effects (Table 1). We also discuss how notice and compre-
hension related to participant behavior and present qualitative
results on users’ opinions and perceptions of the warnings.
3.6.1 Behavioral Effects
Contextual The CTR for the contextual warning was very
high: 33/40. There were a total of 11/40 alternative visits: 7
non-clickthroughs and 4 occasions where a participant who
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Table 1: We measured clickthrough rates (CTR) and alternative visit rates (AVR) in treatment rounds of the laboratory study.
Contextual Warning Interstitial Warning
Round Participant Instructions CTR AVR CTR AVR
Control 1 Find the total area of Italy in square kilometers
on Wikipedia or WorldAtlas.
– – – –
Control 2 Report the price of a pair of men’s New Balance 574
on JoesNewBalanceOutlet or 6pm.com.
– – – –
Treatment 1 Find the political party of Taiwan’s Premier on
TheNewsLens or FocusTaiwan.
15/20 7/20 7/20 13/20
Treatment 2 Find the name of the girl reported missing in Barbados
on Feb 11, 2019 on BarbadosToday or LoopNewsBarbados.
18/20 4/20 11/20 10/20
clicked through a warning went back to search again using
the secondary source.
Interstitial The CTR for the interstitial warning was much
lower: 18/40. We observed 1 alternative visit after a click-
through and 22 alternative visits after non-clickthroughs, for
a total AVR of 23/40.
3.6.2 Notice and Comprehension
Contextual In the contextual treatment group, 13/20 par-
ticipants stated during interviews that they were not aware
they had been shown disinformation warnings. All of these
participants clicked through both warnings. 4 reported that
they did not notice the warnings at all; the other 9 noticed
the icons but did not notice the text. In other words, over half
(9/16) of participants who noticed the contextual warnings
did not comprehend their meaning.
Interstitial All 20 participants noticed the interstitial warn-
ings, and 12 understood that the warnings were about about
disinformation. 7 others instead believed the warnings com-
municated a risk of “harm,” a “virus,” or another “security
threat” and quickly clicked to go back without reading any of
the text. The other participant who failed to understand the
warnings’ purpose clicked through in both treatment rounds;
when asked why he clicked through he explained that he was
focused on getting the information for the study and “probably
would have reacted differently” outside of the study.
3.6.3 Opinions on Disinformation Warnings
As part of the interview, we displayed printouts of both
warning designs and asked for the participant’s opinions about
the warnings’ relative merits and general effectiveness.
Contextual When asked which warning design they be-
lieved would be more effective in general, a small minority
(6/40) chose the contextual warning. 5 of these participants
were in the interstitial treatment group.
5 participants noted that the contextual warning did not
require users to “commit” by clicking a link before seeing
the warning. 1 participant explained, “you’re immediately
presented with alternatives, whereas for the interstitial I’m
already there and committed a click, so I want to go forward.”
Another preferred the contextual warning because it was eas-
ier to bypass: “[I] just wanted to find a link to click on very
quickly, it doesn’t take as much effort to avoid compared to
the interstitial.”
5 other participants emphasized the “always-on” nature of
the contextual warning. 1 participant liked how they could
“always see the warning when browsing Google search re-
sults without having to click around.” Another felt that the
contextual warning was paternalistic because it did not al-
low the opportunity to make an unadulterated choice, instead
“direct[ing] you to which [results] you should visit.”
15 participants said that the contextual warning was not
noticeable. 1 specified that “the exclamation point is very
subtle... you’re not going to notice it.”
Interstitial 34 participants—an overwhelming majority—
felt that the interstitial warning would be more effective in
general. When asked why they thought the interstitial was
more effective than the contextual warning, 32 mentioned that
it was more noticeable. 17 mentioned the color red, with 1
participant noting that “everybody knows red means stop.”
19 participants remarked on how the the warning cannot
be bypassed without input from the user. 1 participant sum-
marized this by saying that “it stops the flow of the user and
forces them to take an action.” Other findings suggest that
design cues contributed to the warning’s effectiveness; par-
ticipants mentioned that the red color and text “implied that
the user is in danger” and that the text was “more instructive
than the text on the contextual warning.”
When asked about drawbacks to the interstitial warning, 5
participants focused on the inconvenience and the potential
for warning fatigue. The sentiment was best described by one
participant who said that they would “probably turn it off in
the settings” if the warning showed up frequently.
Improving Warning Designs Many participants (17) sug-
gested that more informative disinformation warnings would
be more effective. Suggestions included adding “more about
why this particular site was flagged,” definitions of terms
used, and more explicit descriptions of potential harms. Con-
versely, 7 others urged “short and concise” messages that
“[get] the point across quickly.”
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5 participants suggested using different warnings depend-
ing on severity and whether the user had visited the website
before. Another 5 recommended continuing to display warn-
ings even after a user had clicked through on that website
before, arguing that warnings would be more effective if users
were “consistently reminded that [the page] may not be com-
pletely safe or factual.”
Participants also suggested alternate warning forms: pop-
ups, banner messages, or line-specific highlighting showing
instances of false information.
Trust The source of the warning was important to many
participants. 8 indicated that they were more likely to be de-
terred by a browser warning if they knew that it was triggered
by Google, since they trusted the company’s judgment. 1 par-
ticipant explained that they clicked through the interstitial
warning because they understood that Princeton University
had flagged the website, and they felt that the university was
not a credible source of judgment about online disinformation.
The second theme underlying trust judgments was previous
experiences with browser warnings. 7 participants expressed
that they distrusted the warnings due to previous encounters
with false positive warnings or overly restrictive site blockers
on institutional networks (e.g., in high school).
Risk 7 participants expressed the opinion that disinforma-
tion is not a serious threat or that it is not as harmful as mal-
ware. One participant explained that they typically comply
with browser warnings but reacted differently to the disin-
formation warning: “I don’t like the idea of someone telling
me where or what I am allowed to access. You can give me
suggestions. It was because I realized it was a disinformation
warning and not a malware warning that I went back to try
and get to the website.” Another participant characterized this
sentiment sharply, saying “Disinformation warnings should
not make it harder to access the site.”
3.7 Discussion
Contextual vs. Interstitial Warnings The interstitial
warning was distinctly more noticeable and comprehensible
than the contextual warning, and also far more effective at in-
ducing behavioral changes. Similar findings in security warn-
ings research prompted the field to shift away from contextual
formats and towards interstitial formats. Those working to
counter disinformation are only just beginning to make this
shift; contextual warnings are currently the dominant format
in both research and deployment. While contextual warnings
may still have a role to play in countering disinformation,
interstitial warnings and other forms of active, interruptive
warnings clearly merit further consideration.
Impact of Visual Design Choices The iconography, colors,
and text styles used in our warnings impacted how well the
warnings attracted participants’ attention and affected partici-
pants’ behavior. The icon we added to the contextual warning
made the warning more noticeable but did not necessarily aid
with comprehension, as many participants who noticed the
icon still failed to notice the text. The red background of the
interstitial warning contributed to its effectiveness, but may
also have reduced comprehension as participants seemed to
react quickly upon seeing the red color without taking the
time to read or understand the message of the warning. Again
drawing from security warnings research, future work should
use comparative effectiveness studies to isolate the effects of
individual visual design choices.
3.7.1 Mechanisms of Effect
So few participants complied with the contextual warning
that it is difficult to draw conclusions about what caused the
behavioral effect. For the interstitial warning, however, we
found evidence for three different mechanisms by which the
warning induced behavioral changes.
Informativeness Warnings science literature focuses on
how a warning educates the user and allows them to make
an informed decision about how to proceed [86, 104]. In our
study, just under half of the alternative visits (11/25) came
from participants who comprehended the interstitial warnings.
Although other factors may also have influenced these users’
behaviors, we can say with certainty that they made informed
decisions about how to proceed with the task.
Fear of Harm Another reason that the interstitial warnings
exhibited a strong effect on participants’ behavior is that the
warnings’ threatening appearance caused users to believe
they were at risk of harm if they continued. In some cases,
participants who chose to visit alternative sites without com-
prehending the warning perceived a risk of harm but did not
identify a specific harm that they were concerned about. Oth-
ers misinterpreted the warning and believed that it described
a risk of receiving a computer virus or other security threat.
If a warning is going to convey a risk of harm, it should be
specific and narrowly scoped; otherwise users may perceive
the warnings as irrelevant or false positives, which would re-
duce the behavioral effect [10, 15, 18, 20, 105]. As long as
the specific harm is made clear, however, using design cues
to additionally convey a general risk of harm may improve
the effectiveness of the warning.
Friction Finally, part of the interstitial warning’s strong ef-
fect was due to the friction it introduced into participants’
workflows. Some participants preferred to go back to the
search results and choose another source rather than read the
warning, decide whether to believe and comply with it, and
click through it. As with the “fear of harm” mechanism, fric-
tion must be used carefully to avoid inducing warning fatigue
or habituating users to ignore warnings. Further, friction can
be thought of as a degradation of the quality of the user’s
experience. Even if a warning is highly effective at changing
behaviors, platforms may be hesitant to deploy that warning
if its effect relies on making the platform harder to use.
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3.7.2 Limitations
Security warnings studies have observed challenges in
studying behavioral responses to risks in laboratory settings,
particularly with respect to ecological validity [100]. We en-
countered similar challenges in this study.
Our sample was small in size and biased in several ways;
thus our findings should be understood as illustrative but not
representative. It is important to identify if our findings can
be replicated by larger, more diverse populations.
Because participants used our computer and we were watch-
ing over their shoulder, some participants reported that they
behaved differently in the study than they might have in real
life. Others may not have reported such because they were
reluctant to admit that they behaved with bias or because the
effect was unconscious. An experimental design that allows
participants to use their own computers in their own envi-
ronments (i.e., not in a laboratory) could offer more realistic
observations of how participants assess risk.
Finally, although participants appeared to be driven to com-
plete the research tasks, they were not personally invested
in completing the tasks or finding correct answers to the
queries. The role-playing aspect of the study may not have
been strongly immersive, and there were no extrinsic rewards
or penalties that incentivized correct answers. Further, be-
cause our search tasks did not pertain to participants’ social or
political contexts, participants had little reason to engage in
motivated reasoning. Motivated reasoning can strongly influ-
ence users’ perceptions of information relevant to their social
or political beliefs [106], so in those contexts, the warning
effects that we demonstrate may be weaker.
4 Crowdworker Study
In our second study, we aimed to verify whether interstitial
disinformation warnings are truly effective at changing users’
behaviors and investigate the mechanisms behind that effect.
Understanding the mechanisms of effect allows us to reason
about the utility, limitations, and risks of deploying interstitial
disinformation warnings.
Our research questions were:
RQ1: Do interstitial disinformation warnings cause
users to choose alternative sources of information? We
sought to establish whether the bias of our sample population
or the limitations of the laboratory task significantly affected
the observed outcomes. We recruited a larger, more diverse
participant pool from Amazon Mechanical Turk (Section 4.6)
and adjusted the experimental design to account for limita-
tions we observed in the laboratory (Section 4.2).
RQ2: Do interstitial warnings that effectively inform
users about the risks of disinformation cause users to
choose alternative sources of information? We tested
whether participants understood the warnings, then compared
the behavioral effects of informative and uninformative warn-
ings to isolate the impact of informativeness on behavior.
RQ3: Do interstitial warnings that communicate a
risk of personal harm cause users to choose alternative
sources of information? We tested whether warnings that
caused users to feel that they were at risk of harm produced
substantially different behavioral effects than warnings that
did not cause this perception.
RQ4: Does user partisan alignment (with respect to
U.S. politics) moderate users’ behavioral responses or
their perceptions of interstitial warnings? Research in po-
litical science shows that political orientation affects judg-
ments of information credibility [107] as well as the effec-
tiveness of misinformation warnings [93]. We included this
research question in order to detect if partisan alignment cre-
ated a bimodal distribution in responses to warnings.
The basic structure of the task and the key behavioral out-
comes remained the same as in the laboratory study. We in-
formed participants that they were participating in a study of
search engine usage and research behaviors, then guided them
through a series of four research tasks using a search engine,
alternating between control and treatment rounds. In each
treatment round, the participant encountered one of the eight
candidate interstitial disinformation warnings upon clicking
certain search results. We measured whether the participant
clicked through the warning and whether they visited an al-
ternative site. We report the overall CTR and AVR across all
observations in order to answer RQ1.
We used surveys after each warning encounter to measure
how informative the warning was and how strongly the partici-
pant perceived the warning to convey a risk of harm. RQ2 and
RQ3 concern the relationship between AVR and these survey
responses. A standard analysis approach would have been
to randomly assign participants to warnings, then compute
statistical tests across the conditions. Unless the differences
in effect between warnings were dramatic, however, this ap-
proach would have required a massive number of observations
on each warning to establish statistical significance.
We instead employed a multi-armed bandit algorithm,
which allows efficient exploration of a larger design space
than is traditionally possible. As we received successive ob-
servations, the bandit increased the odds that participants
encounter the warnings proving to be most and least informa-
tive and most and least effective at conveying fear of harm.
After all observations were completed, significantly more par-
ticipants had encountered these top- and bottom-performing
warnings, providing us with the statistical power needed to
test our hypotheses. Section 4.5 discusses the design and
implementation of the multi-armed bandit.
4.1 Warning Designs
We created eight candidate interstitial disinformation warn-
ings: four designed for informativeness and four designed to
evoke fear of harm (see Table 4 in Appendix B.1). We first
developed a common layout for the warnings, consisting of an
icon, a title, a primary message, an optional detailed message,
and two buttons. This layout differed from the laboratory
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(a) Informative warning design i2 (b) Harm warning design h3
Figure 3: Examples of warning designs in the crowdworker study. Table 4 in Appendix B.1 describes all 8 warning designs.
interstitial warning in two ways.
First, in the laboratory warning design, the detailed mes-
sage (and the “Continue” button) were hidden at first and
would only be revealed after the participant clicked “Learn
more.” In the crowdworker study, we wanted to ensure that the
full warning message was always displayed, because part of
what we were measuring was the effect of different messages.
Therefore we eliminated the “Learn more” button for the new
warning designs and instead plainly displayed the detailed
message and the “Continue” button on all warnings.
The second change addressed the “Back to safety” button.
This button text implied that the user was in danger, which
was inappropriate for the informative warnings. We changed
the button to read “Go back” and applied this change to both
informative and harm-based warnings in order to maintain a
common interaction design across all warnings.
For both groups of warnings, we generated a few options
for icons, titles, and messages, then created candidate designs
by choosing permutations of these elements and inserting
them into the layout template.
Informative Warnings We designed the informative warn-
ings to be visually nonthreatening and clearly explanatory in
their messages (see Figure 3a). The warnings included one of
two icons—either a generic exclamation point icon or a po-
liceman silhouette—and displayed black text against a white
background. The warning messages explained the nature and
consequences of disinformation in varying detail: some ex-
plicitly defined the term “disinformation,” some asserted that
“experts” had labeled the site as containing “false or mislead-
ing” information, and others provided clear guidance on how
to behave (“finding alternative sources of information”).
HarmWarnings The harm warnings (see Figure 3b) con-
tained little explanatory text and used forceful language, col-
ors, and icons to suggest a serious threat. The warnings used
either a skull-and-crossbones icon or the policeman icon, and
the content was colored white against a red background. The
most extreme warning design simply said: “WARNING: This
website is dangerous.” The other three were titled “Security
Alert” and indicated in the messages that the threat had to do
with information quality.
4.2 Task Design
We aimed to keep procedures for the crowdworker study
as similar to the laboratory study as possible, but the different
setting and research questions necessitated three changes.
First, because crowdworkers participate remotely and use
their own computers, we could not instrument their browsers
with warnings or control search queries or results. There-
fore, instead of using live Google searches, we developed a
web application to guide participants through the experiment
and simulate a realistic-looking search engine that we con-
trolled (Figure 4). We populated results for each query from
real Google results for that query, directly copying search
results snippets. To simulate results pages and ensure that all
participants saw the exact same content, we used full-page
screenshots of results pages, which participants could browse
similarly to browsing the real website (Figure 5). Unlike in
the laboratory study, we specified the queries to use and did
not direct participants to specific sources.
Second, crowdworkers participated in our study to earn a
wage, which is a very different motivation than our in-person
laboratory subjects for whom study participation was elec-
tive. Crowdworkers may be more focused on completing
the task quickly (in order to earn the task fee) than on en-
gaging meaningfully with the study and behaving as “good”
research participants. One way we addressed the risk was
using qualifications to ensure that only workers with track
records of submitting quality work participated in a study
(see Section 4.6). We also offered a bonus of $1 (43% of
the base fee) to participants who submitted correct answers
for all four research tasks. The bonus created an incentive
for crowdworkers to engage with the tasks, read instructions
carefully, seek accurate information, and take disinformation
warnings seriously.
Finally, we used a series of surveys in lieu of directly ob-
serving participants and conducting interviews. Each partici-
pant completed a pre-task survey about their partisan align-
ment, surveys in each round about their behavior and percep-
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Table 2: The crowdworker study task involved two control rounds and two treatment rounds. We report clickthrough rates (CTR)
and alternative visit rates (AVR) for each warning in Table 3.
Round Participant Instructions
Control 1 A train from the Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority derailed in Boston on June 8.
Please find the color of the line that the train was on using the query “MBTA derailment.”
Control 2 In Alabama, the Muscogee tribe filed a lawsuit over a casino that was built on sacred ground.
Please find the name of the casino using the query “muscogee nation casino lawsuit.”
Treatment 1 Please find the names of the two Clatskanie School Board members who were recalled in
May 2018 using the query “clatskanie school board recall.”
Treatment 2
Mike Sanders, the Executive of Jackson County, Kansas, was sentenced to prison in 2018
for embezzlement. Please find the name of the political party to which he belonged using
the query “mike sanders jackson county.”
tion of the warning, and a post-task demographic survey.5
Search Tasks As in the laboratory study, we selected facts
for participants to retrieve that were reported by multiple
sources and obscure enough that participants would not likely
be familiar with the topic or sources. We also ensured that
all search results came from news outlets and that no two
results came from the same outlet, giving participants a greater
variety of choices when choosing sources of information. All
four tasks pertained to events in the U.S. to make the topics
more relevant to our U.S.-based participant population. We
also designed the treatment tasks to specifically cover political
scandals so that participants would find it plausible that news
outlets might publish disinformation about about these topics.
Table 2 presents the tasks and queries.
Procedures After accepting our job on the crowdworking
site, participants visited the website hosting our experimental
tool. The first page displayed instructions and a visual aid
demonstrating how to use the interface, then directed partici-
pants to begin the first search round.
Each round consisted of a research task where the partic-
ipant used our simulated search engine to find a particular
fact from a set of search results. The participant began on
a generic search query page (Figure 4) which displayed in-
structions specifying the fact to search for and the query to
use. When the participant submitted the query, they were nav-
igated to a search results page populated with eight results.
Clicking on a result led to a story page containing the news
article the search result snippet described (Figure 5). These
story pages were full-size screenshots of real news article
web pages, allowing participants to scroll though and read the
articles as if they were browsing the real web pages.
Three of the results in every round were target results: the
search result snippets clearly pertained to the query topic and
the story pages contained the answer to the question. Target
story pages provided the answer clearly in the body of the
article. The other 5 were nontarget results, which linked to
story pages that did not contain the answer. Some nontarget
5See Appendix B.3 for survey details.
results could be identified as erroneous by the results snippet
(i.e., they contained some of the search terms but in a different
context), while others were germane to the query topic but
did not contain the specific piece of information being sought.
The search results were ordered so that the top result was
always a target result, and the other two target results appeared
randomly within the top five. Other than these constraints,
which were designed to ensure that target results were easy
to find, the order of the results was randomized.
On the story page, an instruction box repeated the question
and allowed the participant to submit an answer or return back
to the search results. If the participant chose to go back to
the results page, all results they had selected so far would be
grayed out and the links would be disabled.
In treatment rounds, the participant saw an interstitial warn-
ing the first time they clicked a target result. Our multi-armed
bandit algorithm (Section 4.5) selected the warning design the
participant encountered. All warnings included two buttons:
“Go back” or “Dismiss and continue.” If the user clicked “Go
back” or used the browser back button, they returned to the
search results. The user would not be shown a warning when
they clicked on another result, even if it was a target. If the
user clicked “Dismiss and continue,” they were taken to the
story page, where they had the option to return to the search
results or submit an answer.
When the participant submitted an answer, they were taken
to a survey asking why they chose particular search results.
This was a misdirection to maintain the false premise that
the experiment was studying search engine usage. In control
rounds, submitting this survey led to the next round. In treat-
ment rounds, the next page was a second survey designed
to capture participants’ perceptions of the level of informa-
tiveness and risk of harm conveyed by the warning (see Sec-
tion 4.3). This survey also included an attention check ques-
tion so that we could discard responses from participants who
were not reading instructions carefully.
After completing all four rounds, participants were navi-
gated to a final, demographic survey, then compensated.
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Figure 4: Each round of the crowdworker study began on this
search page.
Figure 5: Clicking on a search result led the participant to a
story page containing a screenshot of a real news webpage,
instructions, and buttons to submit an answer or navigate back.
4.3 Measuring Participant Perceptions of Warnings
After each warning encounter, we used a survey to measure
how informative and how harmful the participant found the
warning. We developed these survey questions based on our
laboratory findings and several small-scale pilot studies.
Informativeness We designed three survey questions to
measure whether participants could identify the topic of the
warning. In our laboratory study, participants who misunder-
stood a warning typically believed that the warning had to do
with malware or another security threat. Therefore we asked
participants in this study to report their belief that the warning
described each of three possible topics: malware, information
theft, and disinformation. The survey asked how strongly the
participant agreed with each of these statements on a Likert
scale from 1 (“Strongly disagree”) to 5 (“Strongly agree”):
• in f o1: The warning said that this site is trying to install
malware.
• in f o2: The warning said that this site is trying to steal
my information.
• in f o3: The warning said that this site contains false or
misleading information.
We used the survey responses to compute an informative-
ness score i in the range [−2,2], which captured the partici-
pant’s certainty that the warning had to do with disinformation.
ip,w = 2 if participant p “strongly agreed” that warning w was
about false or misleading information and “strongly disagreed”
about the other topics. For each point deviation from these
“correct” responses on the Likert scales, ip,w would be reduced
by 1, resulting in a lower score when the participant was un-
certain in their answer or had an incorrect understanding of
the warning. The scoring formula was:
ip,w = max(−2, in f o3− in f o2− in f o1−1)
Harm We used two survey questions to measure whether
a warning caused a participant to believe that they were at
risk of harm. The survey asked how strongly the participant
agreed with each of these statements on a Likert scale from 1
(“Strongly disagree”) to 5 (“Strongly agree”):
• harm1: After seeing the warning, I believe the website
may harm me if I visit it.
• harm2: After seeing the warning, I believe the website
may harm other people who visit it.
In our pilots of these survey questions, participants empha-
sized the distinction between these two forms of harm (per-
sonal and societal). Our research questions only concerned
perceptions of the risk of personal harm, however, so we com-
puted the harm score h for participant p and warning w by
projecting their response to harm1 into the range [−2,2]:
hp,w = harm1−3
4.4 Measuring Participants’ Behaviors
We measured the same behavioral outcomes in this study
as in the laboratory study (see Section 3.4): clickthrough rate
(CTR) and alternative visit rate (AVR).
CTR represents the proportion of warning encounters
where the participant clicked “Dismiss and continue.”
AVR measures how often participants visited an alternative
source before submitting an answer. We recorded an alterna-
tive visit when a participant clicked at least one additional
result after viewing a warning and before submitting an an-
swer. In this study, we measured AVR in both treatment and
control rounds, which allows for estimation of the treatment
effect with respect to a base rate (the AVR in control rounds
when no warning is shown).
4.5 Assigning Warnings
To answer our research questions about mechanisms of
effect (RQ2 and RQ3), we measured for differences in the
behavioral effects between the warnings that achieved the
highest and lowest scores on the perception measures.
The standard method for comparing effect sizes between
treatments is a randomized control test, in which participants
are randomly assigned to treatments (usually in equal num-
bers). The key variable determining how many observations
are needed is the estimated difference in effect size between
treatments. If this difference is small, the study will require
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a large number of observations for each treatment to achieve
statistically significant confidence.
When designing our study, we observed that the difference
in effect sizes between treatments could be small, meaning
that a large sample size could be necessary to evaluate our
hypotheses. Our observations were expensive, however, and
although we were testing 16 different conditions (8 treatments
with 2 outcomes each), we were only interested in comparing
the effects of 4 of those conditions (the top and bottom per-
formers for each outcome). Therefore we sought a method to
efficiently assign participants to warnings so that the top- and
bottom-performing warnings achieved high confidence levels,
but the other warnings (which we would not end up using in
our hypothesis tests) would receive fewer observations and
therefore consume fewer experimental resources.
In this study, we used an adaptive bandit algorithm to assign
participants to warnings based on observations of previous
participants. With each new observation, bandit algorithms
update the probability of each condition in a study accord-
ing to some reward function that aligns with the researchers’
scientific goals [108]. Bandits have been widely used in clini-
cal trials, software design optimization, and political opinion
research [109–111]. We discuss the full details of our multi-
armed bandit implementation in Appendix B.2.
The reward function in our adaptive experiment preferred
disinformation warnings that achieved high and low mean
scores for harm and informativeness. For the first n = 80 par-
ticipants, the algorithm assigned all warnings equally. For
the remaining participants, the reward function prioritized
warnings with the highest and lowest scores for harm and
informativeness in order to maximize our ability to differen-
tiate between warnings. As these maximum and minimum
warnings emerged, the algorithm improved the precision of
our estimates by directing further participants to receive those
warnings rather than less influential ones.
4.6 Participant Recruiting
We collected data from 250 Amazon Mechanical Turk
(MTurk) workers who were based in the U.S. and had com-
pleted more than 5,000 jobs with an approval rate above 97%.
We discarded data from 12 workers who failed an attention
check question, leaving a sample population of 238. The
population was roughly two-thirds male and over half of par-
ticipants were between the ages of 30 and 49. The majority
consumed news media at least five days a week and paid fairly
high attention to politics and current events. We show the full
population demographics in Table 6 in Appendix B.3.
The recruitment materials, consent form, and instructions
described the task as pertaining to the use of search engines
and made no mention of warnings or disinformation. We
estimated the task duration at 15-20 minutes and compensated
participants $2.33 with the opportunity to earn a $1 bonus
(43%) for retrieving the correct answer for all four queries. If
a participant abandoned the task partway through or exceeded
Table 3: We report alternative visit rates (AVR), clickthrough
rates (CTR), and mean informativeness (i¯) and harm (h¯)
scores with 95% confidence intervals.
Liberal Conservative
# AVR CTR i¯ h¯ # AVR CTR i¯ h¯
Control 318 20% – – – 158 16% – – –
Treatment 318 87% 16% – – 158 85% 17% – –
Selected treatments
h1 120 85% 18% −1.94±0.06
1.18
±0.18 46 83% 17%
−1.91
±0.11 –
h3 73 84% 18% – – 27 81% 22% – 1.15±0.46
i3 39 87% 13% 1.41±0.43 – 10 90% 10% – –
i4 17 82% 12% – −0.76±0.69 25 76% 24%
0.88
±0.69
−0.2
±0.62
a 2-hour time limit, we discarded their data and recruited a
replacement participant.
Our study was approved by the Princeton University IRB.
4.7 Results
We pre-registered our analysis methods [112]. We com-
puted mean ratings and 95% confidence intervals for harm and
informativeness scores (see Figures 6 and 7 in Appendix B.2).
As top and bottom performers, we selected the warnings with
the highest and lowest mean ratings where the 95% confi-
dence intervals did not overlap (see Table 3).
Informativeness Liberal participants identified i3 as the
most informative warning, producing a very high mean score
of 1.41 (on the scale [−2,2]). Liberals also gave two other
warnings high, consistent ratings for informativeness (i2 and
i4). On average, conservatives gave much lower informative-
ness ratings to all of the warnings that we designed to be
informative. Conservatives selected i4 as the most informa-
tive design, with a high mean score of .88. The next most
informative warning conservatives selected was a warning we
had intended to convey harm: h4.
The least informative warning was h1, which achieved con-
sistent, extremely low informativeness scores from both liber-
als and conservatives. h1 was the most extreme warning in the
harm category; the only text it contained was “WARNING:
This website is dangerous.”
Harm Liberals identified h1 as the most threatening warn-
ing with high confidence, providing an average score of 1.18.
Conservatives also gave high harm ratings to h1, but just
slightly higher ratings to h3 (1.15).
Both groups selected i4 as the least harmful warning, al-
though liberals were more likely to give the warning negative
ratings for harm (−0.76) while conservatives gave it more
neutral ratings (−0.2).
CTR The cumulative CTR across all treatments was 16%,
which was noticeably lower than what we observed for in-
terstitial warnings in the laboratory (40%). No individual
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warning in this study demonstrated a higher CTR than the
interstitial warning we tested in the laboratory.6
AVR The cumulative AVR across all treatments was 86%,
compared to 19% in control rounds. We evaluated whether
this difference was significant using a one-sided z-test. We
rejected the null hypothesis that the AVR was equivalent in
control and treatment rounds with a z-score of 22.44 and a
p-value of 1.48e−111.
We tested whether there was a significant difference in
AVR between top- and bottom-rated warnings for harm within
the liberal or conservative groups. For liberals, we used a
one-sided z-test and failed to reject the null hypothesis that
the AVR was equal for the two warnings (p = 0.41). For
conservatives, we used Fisher’s exact probability test (due to
the small sample size of conservative participants) and also
failed to reject the null hypothesis (p = 0.54).
Next, we tested whether there was a significant difference
in AVR between top- and bottom-rated warnings for infor-
mativeness within the liberal or conservative groups. Again,
we failed to reject both null hypotheses that AVR was equiva-
lent, using a z-test for liberals (p = 0.27) and Fisher’s test for
conservatives (p = 0.54).
4.8 Discussion
This study replicated the strong behavioral effect of inter-
stitial disinformation warnings that we observed in the labora-
tory study. We also demonstrated that it is possible to design
interstitial disinformation warnings that effectively inform
users that a website may contain disinformation. Conveying
that a website may contain disinformation is a necessary step
in prompting users to think critically about the website’s trust-
worthiness. Past studies have shown that critical thinking is
among the most important predictors of a user’s ability to
correctly judge the accuracy of information [107, 113].
Our instrument, however, did not measure a significant
difference in effect between informative and uninformative
warnings. This suggests that the behavioral effects we ob-
served may not be strongly associated with comprehension
of the warning’s message or use of critical thinking. If infor-
mativeness is not the key causal factor in changing behaviors,
then warnings are not achieving the intended goal of help-
ing users make informed decisions. Future work will need to
consider how to develop warnings that do achieve this goal.
As we found that neither informativeness or fear of harm
explained the warnings’ behavioral effects, we hypothesize
that the friction and inconvenience introduced by the warning
may be important causal factors. We established evidence for
this theory in our laboratory study (Section 3.7.1), although
we did not test it in the crowdworker study.
Limitations There may have been moderator variables we
did not measure that affected the relationship between warn-
6We did not perform significance tests for CTR, as our research questions
pertained only to AVR.
ing perception and behavioral changes. User interviews and
detailed qualitative surveys, like those we conducted in our
laboratory study, can help surface these variables, but these
methods are difficult in a crowdworker setting.
We also note that while our crowdworker sample was more
diverse than our laboratory sample, neither sample was rep-
resentative of the American population. The behavioral ef-
fects we observed were fairly consistent across demographic
groups, however. Importantly, our study population only in-
cluded Americans. Cross-cultural research is needed to un-
derstand if the effects we observed apply globally.
5 Conclusion
In this section, we provide recommendations for future
evaluation and deployment of disinformation warnings.
5.1 Directions for Future Research
Future work can adapt our methods to measure how the
effects we demonstrate interact with other factors known to
impact adherence to warnings and receptivity to disinforma-
tion. These factors include repetition of warnings [10, 15, 18,
20, 105], users’ age and level of digital literacy [114, 115],
their tendency towards cognitive reflection [113, 116, 117]
whether users are repeatedly exposed to the information that
they are being warned about [19, 89], and whether that infor-
mation has a partisan skew that aligns or conflicts with the
user’s ideology [115, 118, 119].
Another important direction is to measure for unintended,
potentially harmful effects of interstitial disinformation warn-
ings. These may include an effect on perceptions of infor-
mation that does not have a warning attached (either implied
truth [93] or general distrust [89]) or a decrease in trust of the
institution identified as the source of the warning. There may
also be effects caused by repeated exposure to interstitial dis-
information warnings over time, such as warning fatigue [20].
Finally, future work should evaluate the effects of other
types of interstitial warnings that command users’ attention
and require interaction. Two active formats that platforms
have begun to experiment with are popup windows, which
users must dismiss, and overlays that obscure content until
the user clicks to show the content [120, 121].
5.2 Informing Platforms’ Disinformation Warnings
Interstitial warnings have the potential to be highly effective
tools for countering disinformation. Compared to contextual
warnings, interstitials are easier for users to notice and com-
prehend. Platforms that continue to use contextual warnings
should be aware that the warnings’ effects are minimal, and
that making the warnings more prominent and explicit may
increase their effectiveness.
More generally, platforms must take evidence-based ap-
proaches to developing and deploying disinformation warn-
ings. By releasing data, conducting internal evaluations, and
collaborating with independent researchers, platforms can sig-
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nificantly advance their capacity to counter disinformation
with warnings, just as browser vendors did when developing
warnings for other online threats [10, 13–15, 17, 19].
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A Laboratory Study Interview Questions
1. How would you define disinformation?
2. What is the difference between disinformation and mis-
information?
3. What features or elements of a website would make you
think that a site may contain disinformation?
4. What do you look for in a site before you consider it
trustworthy?
5. Have you ever encountered disinformation before this
study?
6. What was your first reaction when you saw the disinfor-
mation warning?
7. Have you encountered browser warnings before?
8. Do you know what these browser warnings were warning
against?
9. How effective are browser warnings in your experience?
10. How effective do you think browser warnings are for the
average internet user?
11. Between a full-page and an in-context search result warn-
ing, which browser warning do
12. you think would be more effective in deterring users
from clicking through or consuming information from a
website?
13. Why do you think your chosen browser warning type is
more effective?
14. Would you prefer a browser with or without warnings?
15. Do you consider browser warnings inconvenient?
16. How would you improve browser warnings to be more
effective?
17. What is your age?
18. What is your gender?
19. What is your nationality?
20. What is your area of study?
21. Do you have any experience studying disinformation or
related areas?
22. How many minutes do you spend reading the news on
average per day?
23. On a scale of 1 to 5, with 1 being strongly liberal and 5
being strongly conservative, where would you put your-
self?
B Crowdworker Study Supporting Materials
B.1 Warning Designs
We show the contents of all eight warning designs in Ta-
ble 4. Figure 3 in Section 4 shows examples of informative
and harm-based warnings.
B.2 Multi-armed Bandit Implementation
Our bandit was based on the ε-greedy algorithm [108],
which consists of two phases. In exploration, the algorithm
assigned arms randomly to subjects. After a defined number of
exploration iterations e, the algorithm moved to exploitation,
where it assigned the top-performing arm (i.e., the arm that
maximized the reward function) with a probability of 1-ε;
with probability ε it assigned a random arm. Since subjects
were each assigned two warnings, the bandit selected from
the ε-distribution independently for each arm.
Each of our eight warning designs corresponded to two
bandit arms: one for harm scores and one for informativeness
scores. In the two treatment rounds of the experiment, the ban-
dit drew one arm using the harm scores and the other using the
informativeness scores, with the draw order randomized. Fur-
ther, in order to answer RQ4, we modeled subjects’ partisan
alignment as a mediator variable and maintained indepen-
dent response sets for liberals and conservatives. Therefore
our bandit was divided into four distributions of eight arms
each: liberal-harm, liberal-informative, conservative-harm,
and conservative-informative.
Bandit Reward Function Each time the bandit selected an
arm (to assign a warning to a subject in a treatment round),
it computed the current reward for all arms and used these
reward values to weight the distribution from which it drew.
Arms that had a larger reward value were more likely to be
selected.
The primary criteria that affected our reward function was
extremeness. Arms that had received significantly higher or
lower mean ratings than the average arm accrued larger re-
wards so that subjects were more likely to be assigned to top
and bottom performing arms.
The secondary criteria was precision. Our reward function
preferred arms for which we had high confidence that succes-
sive ratings would not significantly change the mean rating. In
other words, when many subjects had provided similar ratings
for an arm, that arm received a larger reward, and when there
were few ratings or those ratings were divergent, the reward
was smaller. Including the precision component in the reward
function was intended to reduce the confidence intervals for
the mean ratings of the selected arms.
The reward function for arm a, f (a), was the weighted sum
of the extremeness component ea and the precision compo-
nent pa. Before summing, each component was multiplied by
a weight, we and wp, such that we+wp = 1 and we wp.
fa(t) = we(ea)+wp(pa)
We computed ea as the deviation of the arm’s mean rating
(x¯a) from the mean rating of all n arms.
ea = |x¯a−Σnk=0(x¯k)|
We computed pa as the number of observations (Na) the
arm had received divided by the variance (σ2a) in ratings. Thus
pa grew as variance decreased (because subjects were agree-
ing) and shrank as the number of observations grew (because
the next marginal observation became less likely to change
the mean score). We also used a function f (σ2a) to avoid un-
defined values for pa in the cases where σ2a was zero (because
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Table 4: We developed 8 interstitial warning designs for the crowdworker study.
Harm (white on red background) Informativeness (black on white background)
ID h1 h2 h3 h4 i1 i2 i3 i4
Icon Skull Skull Policeman Policeman Exclamation Policeman Policeman Exclamation
Title WARNING Security Alert Security Alert Security Alert False or
Misleading
Content
Warning
Fake News Warning False or
Misleading
Content
Warning
Fake News Warning
Primary
message
This website
is dangerous.
This website
contains
misleading
or false
information.
This website
is dangerous.
This website
contains
misleading
or false
information.
This website
presents itself
as news, but it
contains
information
that experts
have identified
to be false or
misleading
This website
contains
misleading
or false
information.
This website
contains
misleading
or false
information.
This website
presents itself
as news, but it
contains
information
that experts
have identified
to be false or
misleading
Details None None Consider
finding
alternative
sources of
information.
None This website spreads
disinformation: lies,
half-truths, and
non-rational
arguments intended
to manipulate public
opinion.
It can be difficult to
tell the difference
between real news
and disinformation,
but it poses a serious
threat to national
security, election
integrity, and
democracy.
This website spreads
disinformation: lies,
half-truths, and
non-rational
arguments intended
to manipulate public
opinion.
It can be difficult to
tell the difference
between real news
and disinformation,
but it poses a serious
threat to national
security, election
integrity, and
democracy.
Consider
finding
alternative
sources of
information.
Consider
finding
alternative
sources of
information.
all ratings were equal) or undefined (because there were no
ratings yet). z was a parameter value close to zero.
pa =
Na
f (σ2a)
f (σ2a) =
{
z if σ2a = 0 or Na = 0
σ2a else
Simulation and Parameter Selection We designed a sim-
ulation procedure to guide selection of assignments for the
bandit’s parameters, which include the number of exploration
rounds e, the randomness factor ε, the weights of the two re-
ward components wp,we, and the constant replacement value
z used when an arm’s variance is 0. The simulation generated
user ratings by drawing from discrete normal distributions
with static biases assigned to a few arms to encode our belief
that some arms would receive categorically higher or lower
scores than others. For harm ratings, we assigned a +1 bias to
one arm and a−1 bias to another arm at random. For informa-
tiveness ratings, we assigned two positive and two negative
biases. These biases differ for the two types of ratings because
pilot tests of the warning designs reported generally neutral
Table 5: For each parameter of the bandit algorithm, we
simulated a range of possible assignments, then selected the
final assignments that achieved optimal performance.
e ε wp we z
Range [30,40, . . . ,90] [.05, .1, . . . ,0.2] [.1, .2, . . . ,−0.9] 1−wp 0.2
Final 80 0.2 0.1 0.9 0.2
harm scores for most warnings but more diverse opinions
about informativeness.
We simulated the experiment with n= 250, marking a simu-
lation as a success if top- and bottom- performers were clearly
established (i.e., if the arms with the highest and lowest mean
scores had nonoverlapping 95% confidence intervals). We
first simulated 224 permutations of assignments 20 times
each, then selected assignments with a success rate ≥ 85%
and simulated those an additional 100 times. Among the con-
figurations that achieved at least 90% success in the second
round of tests, we selected the configuration with the lowest
value for e as we wanted to maximize exploitation. The set
of parameters we test and the final assignment is shown in
Table 5.
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i1 h1 i2 h2 i3 h3 i4 h4
Warning
2.0
1.5
1.0
0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
S
co
re
s
Informativeness - conservatives
i1 - 8 ratings
h1 - 46 ratings
i2 - 10 ratings
h2 - 11 ratings
i3 - 10 ratings
h3 - 27 ratings
i4 - 25 ratings
h4 - 21 ratings
(a)
i1 h1 i2 h2 i3 h3 i4 h4
Warning
2.0
1.5
1.0
0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
S
co
re
s
Informativeness - liberals
i1 - 16 ratings
h1 - 120 ratings
i2 - 20 ratings
h2 - 21 ratings
i3 - 39 ratings
h3 - 73 ratings
i4 - 17 ratings
h4 - 12 ratings
(b)
Figure 6: Mean informativeness ratings and 95% confidence
intervals for conservative participants (6a) and liberal
participants (6b).
i1 h1 i2 h2 i3 h3 i4 h4
Warning
2.0
1.5
1.0
0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
S
co
re
s
Harm - conservatives
i1 - 8 ratings
h1 - 46 ratings
i2 - 10 ratings
h2 - 11 ratings
i3 - 10 ratings
h3 - 27 ratings
i4 - 25 ratings
h4 - 21 ratings
(a)
i1 h1 i2 h2 i3 h3 i4 h4
Warning
2.0
1.5
1.0
0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
S
co
re
s
Harm - liberals
i1 - 16 ratings
h1 - 120 ratings
i2 - 20 ratings
h2 - 21 ratings
i3 - 39 ratings
h3 - 73 ratings
i4 - 17 ratings
h4 - 12 ratings
(b)
Figure 7: Mean harm ratings and 95% confidence intervals
for conservative participants (7a) and liberal participants
(7b).
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B.3 Survey Questions and Responses
Each participant in the crowdworker study answered a series
of personal survey questions. We show the questions and
response distributions (Table 6) below.
1. How old are you? (18-120)
2. What is your gender? (M, F, Non-binary, Prefer not to
answer)
3. Are you currently pursuing education? If so, at what
level? (No, High school or equivalent, Undergraduate
degree, Master’s degree, Professional Degree, Doctorate)
4. What is the highest level of education you have com-
pleted? (High school or equivalent, Some college, Under-
graduate degree, Master’s degree, Professional Degree,
Doctorate)
5. When it comes to politics, how would you describe your-
self? (Liberal, Conservative, Neither liberal nor conser-
vative) 7
• (if Liberal selected) Would you call yourself a
strong liberal or a not very strong liberal?
• (if Conservative selected) Would you call yourself
a strong conservative or not a very strong conser-
vative?
• (if Neither selected) Do you think of yourself as
closer to a conservative, closer to a liberal, or nei-
ther?
6. During a typical week, how many days do you watch,
read, or listen to news on TV, radio, printed newspapers,
or the Internet, not including sports? (0-7)
7. How much attention do you pay to news about national
politics on TV, radio, printed newspapers, or the Internet?
(A great deal, a lot, a moderate amount, a little, or none
at all)
Table 6: Response distributions for the demographic survey
questions asked during the crowdworker study.
Liberal Conservative Total
Total 159 79 238
Gender
Male 101 46 147
Female 54 33 87
Non-binary 3 – 3
N/A 1 – 1
Age
18-29 43 16 59
30-49 92 46 138
50-64 22 12 34
65+ 2 5 7
Education
HS 25 16 41
Up to
undergrad
116 59 175
Beyond
undergrad
18 4 22
Media Consumption (0-7) and Attention (1-5)
5+ days,
4-5 attention
63 32 95
5+ days,
2-3 attention
45 23 68
2-4 days,
4-5 attention
8 3 11
2-4 days,
2-3 attention
37 14 51
0-1 days,
1-4 attention
6 7 13
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